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Actium (680, 681), and of the Nile (711-713). We observe, too, the devices on the beak of Aeneas' ship (10.166 ff.), and the belt of Pallas (10.496-499), upon which the fatal wedding night of the Danaids is pictured in gold. I have never seen it noted. . . but I believe that this also was suggested to Aeneas by the recently built temple of Apollo on the Palatine of which the statues of Danaus and his fifty daughters formed one of the chief decorations.

Other passages that may be noted in this connection are 10.134-138, 6.847-848, 7.572-573; these involve separate references to objects of art.

It is clear, then, that, in the brief compass of thirty pages, Dr. Dutton has put together, evidently in the main from personal reading of the great poet, a deal of material of interest to the lover of Vergil.

We may close this imperfect abstract of her paper by calling attention, as she does (29), to two recent discussions of Vergil, perhaps not as well known as they ought to be. The first is Lecture XVIII, pages 403-429, of the book by W. Warde Fowler, *The Religious Experience of the Roman People* (Macmillan, 1911); the chapter deals with Religious Feeling in Vergil. The other is the paper entitled Vergil, by H. W. Garrod, which occupies pages 146-166 of the volume entitled *English Literature and the Classics* (Oxford, 1912). For a review of the latter book, by Professor Van Hook, see *THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY* 8.125-127; for a review of the former book, by Professor C. H. Moore, see *THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY* 5.221-223. To these I may add T. F. Royds, *The Beasts, Birds, and Bees of Virgil* (B. H. Blackwell, Oxford, 1914); W. Warde Fowler, "Virgil's Gathering of the Clans", *Being Observations on Aeneid VII. 601-817* (Blackwell, Oxford; Longmans, Green and Co., New York, 1916); R. S. Conway, *The Youth of Vergil* (Longmans, New York, 1917); and *The Boy Ascanius*, by H. O. Ryder, *THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY* 10.210-214.

C. K.

THE ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF ROMAN HISTORY¹

To those of us who studied the history of our own country in College some fifteen or twenty years ago, the American histories of the last few years seem to speak a new language. Campaigns and heroic exploits, dominant personalities and state papers are yielding space to accounts of Salem importers, records of trade-rivalry, pressure of brewers and farmers upon legislatures and conventions, in fact to a study of the material interests of shippers and producers, who are assumed to be the powers that controlled our long-worshipped statesmen and generals. This tendency, which now permeates all modern history, quickly reacted of course upon the study of ancient history, and the Economic Interpretation has produced not only the excellent special studies

of Francotte, Eduard Meyer and their followers, but has, as we all know, furnished the point of view in the works of Ferrero, Cornford, and a host of others.

The contention of this school is based upon general psychological grounds which are on the whole sound. In brief, they assume that the strongest and most enduring instinct, the will to live, has always driven the human being to get for his own use, by foul means if not by fair, the necessities of life, that, since he acquired the faculty of calculating for the future, he has not only appropriated for immediate needs but has also hoarded against possible exigencies, that the struggle for existence has always been so exacting that he occupies most of his waking hours in satisfying the acquisitive instinct, and that, accordingly, when he acquires social or political power, he is most likely to employ that power for economic ends. It seems to follow that political and social changes are chiefly manifestations and effects of the manoeuvres of this instinct; that consequently a historian should always delve below the political phenomena to the question *cui bono* (*economico*), and should study first of all the economic needs and aspirations of the social groups, assuming that these are the primary causes of social and political movements. I believe that the main contention has a solid basis in fact, and that, though there is always a chance for a slip at any link in the chain of the argument, there have been epochs in some national histories when every link has proved sound. We must admit in any case that the economic factor is at all times likely to be not merely one out of a dozen plausible agents of importance in history, but rather one of the very few dominant forces. There are periods in both Greek and Roman history when purely economic causes mastered the then ruling party and employed the government to their own ends. However, the student of Roman history—and I shall here confine myself to that—finds after a careful attempt to apply this general view of human nature that it somehow fails to work in a surprisingly large number of crises. It is obviously impossible to review the evidence here; to save space I beg permission to refer to an attempt at explaining the causes of Rome's international conflicts which I made some time ago². There, rightly or wrongly, I found myself forced to the conclusion that the economic factor stood out predominantly at only a few points. This conclusion, unexpected as it was, has suggested the need of examining further into Roman conditions for a fuller explanation of the fact.

Let us begin with industrial conditions, where economic pressure upon politics is to-day very patent. The laboring man now exerts a strong influence in governmental affairs. In America, for instance, his class is well organized and commands a powerful vote. No man who has strongly antagonized the group is

¹This paper was read at the Tenth Annual meeting of The Classical Association of the Atlantic States, held at the Central High School, Philadelphia, April 15, 1916.

²*Roman Imperialism* (1914).

ever nominated as a presidential candidate by either party. In the cities, Congressional candidates must take pains to explain their policies to the labor vote. Whether promising to maintain the full dinner pail or to lower the cost of living, both platforms must contain satisfactory planks. All bills dealing with revenue, immigration, 'preparedness', corporations, what not, are scrutinized by the representatives of labor. In a word, domestic affairs and foreign relations are to no small extent controlled by the working man, and it is naturally the economic aspect of each question that most deeply concerns the man who has received least of the world's goods. But at Rome the laboring man had little power. He was either a slave whose voice was never heard, or a client who, considering his immediate advantage, voted as his patron told him. Even if he chose to vote independently his ballot was usually counted in one of the four city wards with those of ex-slave offspring. He could not organize to elevate his economic position, since slave wages and slave conditions of life determined his own. He got only what the ruling powers saw fit to give him, and that was usually charity. It is apparent, then, that in this instance one link of the economic argument proves weak, not because the laboring man did not need and desire material benefits, but because he had no way of exerting effective pressure upon the government to get them. In this case at least the possible economic pressure was neutralized by an adequate 'shock-absorber'.

When we turn from the employees to the employer, a similar difference between Roman and American conditions is disclosed. Our business men hold a position of esteem that the world has never before accorded to men of business. The banker, the manufacturer, and the merchant are the first to be heard in the legislatures. They organize, retain counsel to draw up bills and to secure their passage. What with our economic theories which teach us to measure the worth of civilization in terms of prosperity and our democratic abandonment of the old class distinctions which permits a new aristocracy of wealth to arise and impose the standards of the dollar mark, we yield as a matter of course to the claims of this class. We consider a business administration as the greatest of boons, we look upon the banker as the leading citizen, we consult the manufacturer of perambulators on questions of education and world peace. Now, obviously, this has not always been so, despite the economists' axiom that human nature has always been the same. It is not so long ago that the business man carried the apologetic air of a parvenu with him when he appeared in the exclusive circles of European courts. So it was at Rome. There the nobles spoke the words *negotiator* and *mercator* with much the same curl of the lip as a somewhat old-fashioned wife of a Prussian Oberst would expectorate the word *Kaufmannskreise* to-day. So far was the business man from being a leading citizen at

Rome that even Cicero, who needed him for his *concordia ordinum*, found it possible to discuss whether he was quite respectable. Cicero concluded that he was! But Cicero was equally sure that any man who went to the provinces on a business tour was beneath contempt: a worthy citizen could hardly leave the center of civilization for mere financial reasons. If wealth had been able to gain for men social and political prestige at Rome, the nobility could not have excluded the capitalists from the Senate as they did till Caesar's day. The *novus homo* seldom made his way to the consulship, and, when the miracle was performed, it was not through financial power but through forensic ability or military prowess. The Roman Republican government was in fact blind to the political value of a soundly based industry and commerce, and failed to appreciate the relatively few Romans of ability who engaged in these pursuits. It might have devised tariffs and subsidies in aid of those who were facing foreign competition, but it did not. A lobby of manufacturers and shippers in the Roman Senate is quite inconceivable to one who knows Roman society and manners intimately. There was economic conflict enough, but the pressure was seldom exerted through political channels: apparently in this case it was the social caste-system that acted as a shock-absorber.

To be sure the man of wealth gained some recognition in a limited field, that is, when the civil service needed him. Since the Roman Republic with its frequent changes of executives could not build up permanent bureaus and boards for revenue collecting and public works, it needed the capitalist to carry the contracts, and for this service it was willing to grant him a title, a ring, and a seat in the theater. Consequently the *equites* became a well organized political influence in the last century of the Republic, and latterday expansion was in some measure attributable to this class; Pompey's commission to the Eastern provinces furnishes an excellent instance of economic causes working through political machinery. But it is interesting to note that the particular class operative in this instance had been able to gain their social position through semipolitical service to the state, and that this position was definitely conceived of as quite inferior to that of the ruling nobility.

The agricultural class on the other hand was very powerful during most of the Republic. The farmers and land owners were probably in control of all the rural tribes, and their interests often coincided with those of the senators, who usually owned large tracts of land. It is rather surprising therefore that we never hear of laws to protect³ Roman farm produce, and that the State itself imported Sicilian grain for distribution, to the detriment of the native farmer. However, even if we cannot find in Roman legislation any traces of positive measures in favor of the farmers,

³See Roman Imperialism, Chapter XVI.

we may perhaps attribute to *their* predominance the apathy of the government to industrial and commercial needs, an unenlightened revenue system, a cumbersome financial policy, and the exclusion of the intricate problems that generally arise from economic conflicts.

To be sure many historians believe that the early wars in Italy were due to the farmers' greed for more land. This seems not at all unreasonable, even if we recall that early Roman custom disallowed aggressive wars—for greed has frequently enough found its way through the most sacred of customs. In the absence of all proof, however, we can only say that the reasonableness of the economic interpretation is not an adequate substitute for facts. Militating against the hypothesis is the fact that Rome did not expropriate much land during the conquest, and that Roman citizens constituted only a part of the colonists to whom conquered land was allotted. The allies shared largely in the so-called Latin colonies. It would seem that the citizen body never was much overcrowded, a fact readily explained by the wastage of wars, the pestilences of the southern climate, and the time-honored custom of *expositio*.

It has been suggested also that the farmers in the tribal assembly entered into the First Punic War with the purpose of relieving themselves of the land-tax by winning the tribute-paying province of Sicily; but if so, they must have been far-sighted enough to know that the new tribute would come to Rome in the form of wheat which would glut their best market. Indeed, if the farmers had weighed these questions at all, it seems likely that those who depended upon the Roman market must have opposed the war, while the more distant ones may have found a balance of advantages in favor of conquests. And this will illustrate our chief difficulty in reaching a satisfactory explanation for a putative common action on the part of the farmers. Being without ready means of transportation, they had to consider the advantages of the market nearest at hand, and thus this group readily split into various diverse factions, each moved by different interests. Perhaps this is why we can point to so little positive legislation that clearly bears the granger stamp. The most positive influence of the landed class seems to me to show itself early in a desire for safety on the border and consequently well ordered relations between tribes. As has often been said, the prospering farmer in the open plains had all to lose and nothing to gain from a state of border-brigandage, so that he became a convert to fetal rules and faith in the sacredness of vested interests. Then he organized his military machine and struck back at the raiders till he converted them to his views—not forgetting to exact an indemnity, and, in special cases, applying the doctrine of dreadfulness. If this interpretation is correct, the economic factor was of great importance in shaping the Latin federation, but that does not imply the presence of a positive economic pressure.

The nobility which directed Rome's policies could of course usually express their desires in action, and their economic interests, which were fairly uniform, were probably not neglected. We have seen that they paid far too little heed to the needs of industry and commerce on the one hand, and of the laboring classes on the other. To their own desires they were naturally not so heedless, though we need not assume that these desires were always of a material nature. The average Roman noble was rather hard and practical, prudently calculating, not very sentimental, but on the whole fairly just. Material interests were very important to him, for he must conserve his property qualifications or fall below his class. For this purpose he needed to have his lands well managed, to receive legacies from his clients, to rule a province which should net him more than his expenses; sometimes he manoeuvred to lead his army where there was booty to be gotten. But the motives that might influence a senator were many and various. Now, the economic interpreter holds that, since man is engaged in acquiring property most of his waking hours, he naturally employs to the same end what political power he may have. If we are to apply this test to the Roman senator, we need to keep in mind that most of the influences about him were not of an economic nature. He was not a business man and he spent very little of his time with his own material concerns. What is more, he was not obsessed with the doctrines of Adam Smith. Problems of state and judicial or legal service usually engaged his attention, so that his daily concerns naturally kept him less occupied with the economic viewpoint than is true of men we know.

Since the economist takes cognizance of environment, we may consider how this affected the Roman senator. From boyhood he lived in the presence of the *imagines* of his ancestors. Some of them had died on the battle field, some had triumphed, some bore names that were inscribed upon laws, and treaties, and dedicated temples. There were among them consuls, judges, orators, governors of provinces—there were no captains of industry. They had won the *memoriam sempiternam* that Roman history held before man as his highest goal. Could the son of a noble pass daily before those statues and not be kindled with a yearning for *gloria*? Nullam enim virtus aliam mercedem laborum periculorumque desiderat praeter hanc laudis et gloriae—a sentence that had not yet lost its meaning even in the dark days of civil strife that made the best of men cynical. No people has ever more treasured the glories and the virtues of ancestors. The nobles themselves wrote the nation's history: Fabius, Cincius, Postumius, Cato, Piso, Fannius, Sempronius, and a score of others. They embodied their deep respect for brave deeds in their institutions: the laudatio funebris, the triumphal arch, the honorary dedications, the heroic burial, the pomp of triumph, and all the rest. To catch the spirit that entered these men one must read Vergil's

'masque of heroes' or Livy's epic of seven centuries. The irresistible determination, the power of self-control, the stolid puritanism, as well as the hardness and self-sufficiency of the native old Roman, were racial qualities, a part of the blood inheritance transmitted after centuries of hard-handed struggle had sifted out the unfit. In the old Roman noble that inheritance was not so diluted that his *virtus* did not quickly respond to the appeal of ancestral memories. It was not till the civil wars cut down the old race, emancipation and immigration mixed the blood, overmuch prosperity induced parasitism, that time-honored ideals went for nought.

As we have said, the daily occupation with the political and diplomatic problems of state somewhat blinded the Roman noble to the economic point of view. He dealt with the intricacies of a hundred treaties made with free, allied, and tributary states; he must consider the state's relations with scores of tribes in every degree of civilization or barbarism all along the border; there were always provinces to keep satisfied, governors to appoint and supervise, armies to levy, shift, and direct. All these matters involved niceties of legal interpretation, of etiquette, position and honors. Engaged in these problems he grew legal-minded, and pompous, but he was hardly likely to become obsessed with the ideal of a business administration. That the Roman Senate never devoted half enough attention to economic questions is largely due to this preoccupation with diplomatic, political, and ceremonial concerns.

Finally, the desire to conserve their own position and power, the *auctoritas senatus*, both for the sake of personal prestige and for the pecuniary advantages which the position entailed, taught the nobility to maintain a conservative régime. If, for instance, some individual consul advocated a war of expansion either for his own advantage or for that of any class, the Senate was likely to oppose him. The aristocracy had in fact learned early that, when a small city-state extended its boundaries too far, a large army was needed to hold the empire, and a popular leader of the army was a menace to aristocratic control.

It would seem, therefore, that Rome was one of the states where the normal economic pressure generally met with strong counteracting forces. The laboring man could not reach the attention of the governing class, the industrial interests were weak and their value underrated. The farmers were so separated geographically that their interests failed to coincide, and the nobility were so preoccupied with purely administrative problems and so jealous of their own prestige that they gave little thought to economic measures. In general it must be said that the Roman economic problems were unusually simple. The gradual conquest of Italy and the provinces more than occupied the surpluse of capital and population so that there was no crying need for industry and commerce. The returns from the simple investments

in land and in capitalistic enterprise sufficed to keep the people in prosperity and presently in flabby desuetude. The intricacies of our economic system, therefore, never threw their inordinate strain upon the government of Rome; and the charge that Livy and Tacitus wrote political history because they were 'economic-blind' misstates the case: they wrote as they did because they grasped clearly the essential facts of Roman society.

However, when we have noted the reasons why economic pressure failed so often to affect the governing powers of Rome, it may be well to guard against a certain prevalent presentation of the reasons. I refer to the loose generality we often meet that economic pressure is more effective in politics at present than at Rome *simply* because industry has grown in bulk, and methods of transportation have quickened with the discovery of steam, coal, and steel. Now, if the preceding analysis is true, the phenomena treated depend not so much upon the absolute importance of capitalistic enterprise, as upon the relative ease with which that enterprise may gain control of the political machinery. Even in the ancient state with its slow-moving commerce and unorganized industries the interests of the shipper and producers could become paramount under favorable political and social conditions. And as an illustration of this I wish to show how the trade rivalry of Marseilles and Carthage led to international conflicts of world-wide importance.

A few years ago a papyrus fragment of Sosos came to light which showed that the fleet of Marseilles—directed by her own commanders and acting as a unit—carried off the honors in the naval battle of 217 which destroyed the Punic fleet. This important share of Marseilles in the war is passed over in characteristic silence by Livy, just as our popular histories used to disregard the part played by the French in the war of Independence. Even Polybius is so close to his Roman source, Fabius, that he fails to give this fact, though he does make a general statement, that Marseilles distinguished herself by her fidelity to Rome at all times, and especially during the Second Punic War. Now, when we look for the underlying meaning of the participation of Marseilles, we must remember that she was not a subject-ally like the Southern Greek cities, that her contingent was under her own command, and that she continued to be treated as an ally *aequo foedere* by Rome for a hundred years after this event. Her position at the beginning of the Second Punic War was that of an ally fighting in a common cause. I am strongly inclined to think that the grievances of Marseilles against Carthage, and the arguments and the schemes which Marseilles urged at Rome against Carthage had much more to do with stirring up the quarrel which led to the Second Punic War than we have supposed⁴.

⁴On Marseilles and Carthage see Schulten, in the article *Hispania*, in Pauly-Wissowa; Niese, *Griechische und Makedonische Staaten*, 1.489; Kahrstedt, *Geschichte der Karthager*, 3.

The situation was as follows. Marseilles had during the sixth, fifth, and fourth centuries flourished in bartering with Ligurians, Celts, and Iberians. Without attempting to found an empire she established trading posts on the Rhone as far as the Loire, on the Gallic coast, then on the Eastern coast of Spain all the way down almost to the straits. She needed only open ports, safe seas, and friendship with the tribes. The wares she produced were good enough and her market so near that she did not need to fear open competition in her natural field. Carthage was at the same time planting trading posts along North Africa, Southern Spain, and the islands of the Western sea, and so her traders came into conflict with those of Marseilles. But under a policy of open ports the Punic traders were at a disadvantage. The products of their home industries were inferior to those of Marseilles and could therefore not well stand open competition. They could draw upon Sicily, Southern Italy, and the East for equally good wares, and did so, but this generally involved an extra middleman's profit and a longer voyage. Hence it is that Punic traders always, when possible, advocated and pressed for a policy of *mare clausum* along Punic possessions. Eratosthenes tells us that the Carthaginians sank every foreign vessel that ventured to appear at the straits, and the Punic treaties which Polybius has recorded in his third book prove that Carthage succeeded in gaining recognition for her policy from states which did not care enough for commerce to protect it by force of arms. Marseilles, however, protested often and fought for her interests. Justinus (43.5) says that Marseilles often defeated the Carthaginians and imposed terms of peace. This would seem to mean that she compelled Carthage to recognize the seas of Eastern Spain as open.

Now of course the Punic nobles who lived upon the returns of African estates⁵ worked by serfs were not always willing to fight in support of a policy advocated by the traders, but the nobility had suffered severely in the First Punic War and in the mutiny which followed, so that the democratic leaders, the Barcids, were free to carry out an aggressive policy in Spain in support of the interests of the commercial and industrial classes. Hamilcar set out from the south of Spain to secure the Hinterland. By persuasion, gifts, and a show of force the Barcids won over tribe after tribe, always increasing and training an army with which more reluctant tribes were won. Of course the trade of the interior tribes was thus diverted from the Massiliot posts on the Eastern coast and directed southward to the Punic posts, and in time to new Punic posts opened nearby upon the Eastern coast. Even if the Barcids did not attempt to close the Greek ports at once, it was evident to Marseilles that her profits were at an end in Spain if Carthage secured all the Hinterland—and that presently her Gallic field would be invaded likewise.

For a *mare clausum* the Barcids seemed to be substituting an equally effective *terra clausa*. And the danger was harder to meet; for, with her fleet, Marseilles might possibly check an attack upon the coast towns by water, but she had practically no army with which to meet the forces working northward and crosscutting her trade routes.

Now be it said at once, the Barcids aimed at far more than commercial interests. The great Hamilcar and his sons intended of course to build up an army and establish a source of recruits with which to avenge the personal and national disgrace of the preceding war, and this fact must not be obscured. But hatred needs fuel, and cannot burn on indefinitely, nor was the hatred of the Barcids for Rome so great that it could have won the support of the Carthaginian landlords to a new death struggle unless it found new fuel. It was this that Marseilles supplied while manoeuvring to protect the profits that she saw so definitely threatened by the Punic advance in Spain, and had it not been for Marseilles I see no reason for doubting that Rome and Carthage might have learned to live on tolerable terms.

But Marseilles, threatened as she was, and incapable of bringing any force against the advancing Punic army, had no recourse but to lay the grievance as effectively as possible before Rome. She could hardly have appealed to Rome's commercial interests; Rome's ruling class cared so little for such matters that they did not even demand open ports for themselves after the Second Punic War, not to mention the First. But the Massiliots could explain, and reiterate, and exaggerate the rumors that went in Spain that the Barcids were raising a larger army than was needed at home. They could and doubtless did harp upon the theme of a war of revenge. At any rate Rome was prodded into demanding a promise from Hasdrubal in 226 that he would not cross the Ebro in arms. To this treaty Marseilles was doubtless a signatory; by it she saved at least two of her trading posts in Spain, Emporia and Rhode, and the routes of Northern Spain which might still tap the resources of Central Spain, while Rome established a point beyond which no vengeful Barcid could go with an army without serving a long-term notice that he was advancing upon Rome. The treaty was, then, of first importance to Marseilles, and, I doubt not, drawn up at her behest. If this interpretation of it is correct, we see that it was in no sense a definition of 'spheres of influence' between Rome and Carthage, and this helps to explain why Rome's alliance with Saguntum south of the Ebro was not considered by any of the ancients as an infraction of the Ebro treaty, as is sometimes held to-day. The Saguntian alliance was apparently a part of Marseilles's general policy. When Saguntum was frightened by the encroachment of Hannibal upon the rear, she of course found ready listeners at Marseilles, to whom the preservation of open ports on the Spanish coast was of vital importance. Marseilles

⁵Diodorus 20.8.

could wish for nothing better than to have Saguntum allied to Rome; and the people of Marseilles could readily explain that a Roman alliance would mean protection of her open port and free commerce. So the alliance was made. Needless to say the alliance nettled Hannibal, for it meant that Punic trade would after all have rivals in Spain, and also that a port would lie open in the rear if he undertook to march upon Italy.

Here, then, is a fair illustration of how even in ancient society, with its slow-moving industry, trade-rivalry could beget serious political conflicts. It should also be noticed that Marseilles was more nearly an aristocracy than Rome, so that the precise form of the government is not necessarily the determining factor. The essential point is that at Marseilles the policies of state were directed by the men who were concerned in the producing and shipping. The governing aristocracy could hardly have been a land-holding class, since Marseilles had but little territory, and its imperial problems were of little importance, since it avoided expansion. The nobles apparently lived on the returns of commerce, and that is why Marseilles built docks, and watch towers on the coast, and trading posts on foreign shores, and fought Carthage for freedom of the seas. But it is also apparent to the student of Greek and Roman history that such control of state-policies by one class engaged chiefly in capitalistic enterprise was of relatively rare occurrence.

Finally, a word about the general philosophy of the economic interpreter. No one will deny that there is a good scientific basis for his main contention, but his reading of human nature usually proves incomplete. The survival of the race does not of course rest wholly upon the self-centered instincts. The altruistic instincts are as old, as deep-seated and as necessary to survival as the egoistic ones; and, moreover, they are more productive of the superimposed layers of custom and folkways that constitute civilization. The human being is a social animal, which implies that, such as he is and has been for ages, he has enough sympathy, sense of justice, and altruism, and he has sloughed off enough of his combativeness, brutality, and selfishness to live in the horde. Add to this that, since men began to interchange ideas, all of society has expressed admiration for altruism and scorn for selfishness—naturally since society benefits by the former while it suffers from the latter. Civilization must by the very premises put a premium upon the social virtues. Ancient society—which after all is but a part of modern society, if we measure up the ages through which our instincts have developed—was wholly like our own in granting social rewards to justice and sympathy and in ostracizing greed and bumptiousness; in fact the race had for countless ages done the same. This inevitable selection has always been tending to eliminate the unsocial, so that the social virtues, which procured a certain advantage to the possessor, have grown instinctive through the surer survival

of the possessor. In this light, then, the acquisitive instinct looms less formidable in the general sum. The tendencies to win sympathy, to do the heroic deed, to sacrifice self somewhat for the group, to imitate those who stand high in public esteem—whatever the instincts may be called—are as deeply rooted and as vital a part of human nature as the impulse to get and to fight for self. If this is true, then it follows that the economic interpretation of history must be wholly inadequate. At any rate, since we cannot possibly invent a scientific formula which will accurately reveal what specific rôle each instinct in human nature will play in a given circumstance, we must as historians continue to study cause and effect in their proper milieu with all possible patience. History produced deductively from the a priori premises that man is a hyena or an angel or anything else, and that he is the same under all social conditions, will obviously not be worth the paper it is written upon⁶.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.

TENNY FRANK.

A CONFERENCE OF COLLEGE LATIN DEPARTMENTS AT VASSAR COLLEGE

A Conference of the Latin Departments of four Colleges, Mt. Holyoke, Smith, Vassar, and Wellesley, was held at Vassar College on November 3. Mt. Holyoke was represented by Professors Hoag, Taylor, and Waites; Smith, by Professors Brady, Gragg and McIlwain; Wellesley, by Professors Hawes, Walton and Fletcher; Vassar, by all the members of its Latin Department. The Conference was a consequence of correspondence about the report of the Commission of The College Entrance Examination Board dealing with the form of defining requirements in Latin for entrance to College; this report had raised specific objection to the New Plan of Admission recently adopted by the four Colleges mentioned above. When it was ascertained that these Colleges were in substantial agreement in their intention to continue the usual method of prescribing certain portions of the works of certain authors, it was suggested that a fuller agreement and a better understanding of the situation

⁶A few months ago Mr. C. W. Macfarlane, "Ex-Vice-President of the American Economic Association", published and gave wide circulation to a pamphlet entitled *Some Observations on the Economic Interpretation of Early Roman History*. Though he well-nigh disarms criticism by disclaiming first-hand acquaintance with the sources of Roman history, and shows such readiness to rely upon the deductive processes in history that it would be unfair to accept him as a representative economist, I should like to mention one or two points. In Chapter II, the criticism of my estimates of confiscated lands given in my *Roman Imperialism*, rests chiefly upon a failure to distinguish between *ager Romanus* and *ager publicus*. For instance, of the 750,000 acres of *ager Romanus* in Etruria (page 15), the greater part was not *ager publicus* at all. Much had been left to the native *cives*, and a large proportion belonged to colonies which I had already estimated in another total. Furthermore, I excluded the Gauls from my estimate (16) because the Senones of the *ager Gallicus*, who had burned Rome, were not treated by the Romans like Italians. Again, though I denied the adequacy of the economic interpretation, I was very far from saying "that material needs played no part" (13) in Rome's foreign policy. Even "deductive processes of thought" (1) should avoid the fallacy of the 'undisturbed middle'. The rest of the pamphlet is pretty well strewn with danger signals of the author's own hand to guard the reader from the pitfalls.